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EURODOLLAR FINANCING OF CASH TENDER OFFERS:
A NEW CHALLENGE TO THE MARGIN REQUIREMENTS
L INTRODUCTION
Until recently, acquisition-minded corporations have satisfied their
appetites by merger, consolidation, or purchase of all the assets of
another corporation. But the past decade's phenomenal increase in
corporate takeovers has resulted in part from the development of an
alternative technique, the cash tender offer.' To gain control of the
target corporation,2 the acquiring offeror makes a public bid to purchase
part or all of the target's outstanding shares at a fixed price usually
representing a premium above market.3 The popularity of the cash
tender offer may be attributed to several factors. A cash bid may be
less expensive than purchase of all the target's assets: the offeror need
only purchase that portion of the outstanding stock necessary to gain
control,4 and avoids the necessity of securing shareholder approval of a
sale of assets-a costly procedure requiring extensive documentation
and compliance with the proxy rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). 5 The cash tender offer may also supplement
merger offers: merger overtures initially rebuffed may become more
palatable to hostile management following a successful cash appeal
directly to the shareholders.' On the other hand, should the offeror
1 Businessmen have placed increasing reliance upon takeovers by cash tender
offers. While only 105 such offers were recorded in the 7 years from 1956 through
1963, there were 186 in the 4 years from 1963 through 1966. Hayes & Taussig,
Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135, 137
[hereinafter cited as Hayes & Taussig]. The authors attribute this increase to four
developments: "1. The superiority of the cash bid over other devices in the event of
resistance . . . . 2. Increasing corporate liquidity. 3. Readily available credit.
4. A new 'respectability' for cash bids." Id. 136.
2 The acquiring corporation would not risk the expense of a tender offer merely
to become an investor in the target. Rather, the offer is usually an initial step in the
takeover and may be followed by a merger proposal. See Fleischer & Mundheim,
Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. Rxv. 317, 318 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Fleischer & Mundheim].
3Although premiums ranged from zero to 44% above market, the median for
cash tender offers during the years 1956 through 1966 was 16% above the market
price 2 days before the offer. Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1, at 140.
4 See Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 2, at 318; Note, Cash Tender Offers,
83 HAxv. L. REv. 377, 378 (1969).
GThe applicable rules are: SEC Regs. 14A, 14C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a, 240.14Q
(1969).
6 The array of defensive tactics at the disposal of incumbent management includes:
splitting the stock, raising the dividend, repurchasing shares, securing outside assist-
ance, launching a publicity campaign, taking legal action, making a counter-active
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fail to acquire sufficient shares for a takeover, the "sunk costs" of the
effort are limited to advertising, legal, and financing fees.7
The acquiring company usually enlists the aid of an investment
banking house to act as the "dealer-manager" coordinating the solici-
tation of tenders from dealers and large shareholders.8 If outside
financing is required, the dealer-manager may act as financial inter-
mediary for the offeror, perhaps arranging for a line of credit with a
bank, pension fund, or insurance company. Alternatively, the dealer-
manager may underwrite an offering of the acquiring corporation's debt
or equity securities, the proceeds of which may be used to finance the
purchase of tendered shares.'
Tight money pressures during 1968 and 1969 not only increased
financing fees but nearly exhausted the supply of credit available to
acquisition-minded corporations." Faced with this dearth of needed
credit at home," offerors are seeking financing on the growing Euro-
dollar market. From July 1968 through January 1970, ninety-one
cash tender offers were recorded with the Securities and Exchange
Commission; thirteen of these offers used foreign financing.'2
Although interest rates may be comparable or higher, financing the
tender offer with an extension of credit from a foreign lender has dis-
takeover, and seeking a defensive merger. See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1, at
142-47. One of management's most common responses is to declare or raise the
dividend, a move which may increase the stock's market price and thereby negate the
attractiveness of the offeror's premium. This response could arguably constitute a
manipulative practice in violation of SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1969).
See Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv. L. REv. 377, 379 n.16 (1969). Further,
proposed SEC rule 10b-12, 33 Fed. Reg. 4632 (1968), clearly forbids a dividend
declaration unless an adequate cash surplus can be shown. See also Schmultz &
Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115 (1967); Note,
Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Management in Contesting Tender Offers,
21 STAN. L. REv. 1104 (1969).
7 Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1, at 137-38.
8 Usually, the dealer-manager's per share commission is twice the normal fee for
purchasing the stock at the same price. The dealer-manager in turn pays a smaller
fee to other broker-dealers for shares they have acquired. See Comment, Application of
Margin Requirements to the Cash Tender Offer, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 109 n.45
(1967).
a Brokers, dealers, and members of a national securities exchange are forbidden
from extending, maintaining, or arranging credit, except'as regulated by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§7(c), 15 U.S.C. §78g(c) (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 15 U.S.C. §78g(c) (1964).
Whether a dealer-manager's participation in the offer constitutes an unlawful
"arranging" will be considered in Part IV of this Comment.
10 See Mertz, Market Place: Tender Offers: Revival is Seen, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 3, 1969, at 64, col. 6.
11 Because bankers do not repudiate commitments for standby credit made several
months in advance, tender offers usually are not restricted by tight money pressures
until slightly after restraints are imposed. See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1, at 138.
'2 Statement of Irving M. Pollack, Director of SEC's Division of Trading &
Markets Before the House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
printed in JAN.-JU N. BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP'. X-6 (Mar. 4, 1970). Among the
foreign financed takeover attempts specifically mentioned by the Commission were the
contests for control of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, UMC Industries, Roosevelt Raceway
and Bath Industries. Notes 16 & 158 infra.
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tinct advantages.13  First, the reservoir of Eurodollars may be tapped
for standby credit when domestic financing is either unavailable or
available only after an extended period. 4 Second, recently instituted
reserve requirements may reduce the availability of credit from domestic
bankers previously able to secure Eurodollar loans from their foreign
branches or from European banks. 5 Third, the target's management
and its allies may have less frequent opportunities to pressure a foreign,
as opposed to a domestic, lender to withhold financing from the offeror."8
The most important advantage of foreign financing, however, may be
the inapplicability of domestic margin requirements. If, as District
13 When Tracy Investment Corp. announced its initial tender offer to the share-
holders of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., its financing consisted of a 9 month loan
of $30 million from Transamerica Financial Corp. The rate of interest was set at
33/2% above the prime interest rate which at that time meant a total interest of approxi-
mately 12I% per annum. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303
F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). After the offer was enjoined because its
financing threatened to violate the Clayton Act, Tracy secured $62 million in Euro-
dollar loans. These loans were to be repaid in 12 months, and the rate of interest
specified was 1274% per annum, again approximately 32% above the domestic prime
interest rate. Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1969, at 20, cols. 4-6. See also 55 FED. Rxs. BLtm.
406 (1969).
14 Though the offeror may find it extremely difficult to acquire credit in this
country, some of the same problems may be encountered abroad. When Liquidonics
Industries, Inc. sought additional financing on the Eurodollar market (note 158 infra),
it found that even those companies with "Triple A" balance sheets were not first in
line for whatever credit became available. Business Week, Oct. 4, 1969, at 32.
15 On June 26, 1969, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System pro-
posed amendments to regulations D and M which would establish a 10% marginal
reserve requirement on certain Eurodollar borrowings by member banks and the sale
of assets to their foreign branches. Proposed Fed. Reg. D & M §§ 204, 213, 34 Fed.
Reg. 11214 (1969). In a later press release, the Board noted that the liabilities of
domestic banks to their foreign branches had more than doubled during the first 6
months of 1969, reaching a record $14.6 billion during the week ending July 30, 1969.
The purpose of these reserve requirements was to moderate this flow of foreign funds
and to remove the advantage accruing to member banks with foreign branches of
using Eurodollars to adjust to domestic credit restraints. CCH FED. BANKING L. REP.
1 95,192 (1969). The Board may have objected to the use of the credit flow from
Europe as an escape valve through which several of the largest domestic lenders
could avoid anti-inflationary policies. In addition, the absence of such restraints
opened the Board to criticism from several European countries whose nationals could
convert local currency into dollars yielding substantially higher returns on the
credit market.
16 Banks, insurance companies, brokerage houses, suppliers, customers, and others
with whom the incumbents have strong business ties may be called upon to purchase
stock on the market, thereby increasing its price above the opponent's offer. They
might also be asked to bring pressure upon major stockholders not to tender their
shares. See Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 2, at 321-22.
The efforts of incumbent management to thwart takeover bids by "friendly pur-
chases" has recently attracted the scrutiny of the SEC. When Gulf & Western Land
Corporation sought tenders from the shareholders of Roosevelt Raceway, Madison
Square Garden, Inc., owner of 26% of the Raceway's stock, urged the investment
banking firm of Goldman, Sacks to purchase all the stock available and pledged to
repurchase at 120% of the cost one year later. The Commission has proceeded against
Goldman, Sacks, charging that they manipulated the stock of Roosevelt Raceway to
drive up the market price. Business Week, Oct. 4, 1969, at 123. The contest for
control of Roosevelt Raceway also involved purchasing arrangements with foreign
institutions with a guarantee that Madison Square Garden, Inc. would "call" the stock
in one year at 120% of the purchase price. See Statement of Irving M. Pollack,
Director of SEC's Division of Trading & Markets Before the House Comm. on
Banking & Ciurrency, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., printed in JAN.-JuN. BNA Sac. RE. &
L. REP. X-6 (Mar. 4, 1970). See also Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
CCH 1969 FED. Sac. L. REP. 92.532 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 1969).
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Court Judge Tenney recently held in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, rnc. v.
Transamerica Corp.,17 regulations G's and T, 19 promulgated by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board) under
section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' ° (1934 Act), are
inapplicable to foreign loan agreements, the offeror or his dealer-
manager may arrange Eurodollar financing to purchase the target's
stock without pledging the collateral required by the margin restrictions.2
II. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER, INC. V. TRANSAMERICA CORP.
On July 23, 1969, Tracy Investment Company (Tracy), the
financial arm of multi-millionaire Kirk Kerkorian, published a tender
offer to purchase 1,000,000 shares of the common stock of Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. (MGM) at $35 per share, a premium of nearly
$7 over market.2 If successful, the takeover bid would have given
Tracy 17 per cent of the outstanding shares,2" making it the largest
MGM shareholder.2" The management of MGM opposed the offer and
sought a series of preliminary injunctions to halt Tracy's efforts to
take up the tendered shares.'
The financing for Tracy's offer was to consist mainly of a
$30,000,000 loan from Transamerica- Financial Corporation (Finan-
cial), a subsidiary of Transamerica Corporation (Transamerica).2
MGM's action to enjoin the offer charged that, because Transamerica
owned 99.6 per cent of United Artists Corporation,27 a major com-
petitor of MGM, the financing would violate section 7 of the Clayton
17303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
1834 Fed. Reg. 9191-96, 9984 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.1-.5 (1969).
19 34 Fed. Reg. 9196-9203, 9984 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1969).
2015 U.S.C. §78g (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 15 U.S.C. §78g (1964).
21 See 303 F. Supp. at 1358.
22 Wall St. 3., July 23, 1969, at 33, col. 1.
28 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344, 1346
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
24 Business Week, Oct. 11, 1969, at 47.
2 5For those who savor the drama of corporate takeover attempts, the MGM-
Tracy fight was good fare if only for its list of participants, including Las Vegas
financier Mr. Kirk Kerkorian who had recently acquired the Flamingo and Inter-
national Hotels and Western Airlines; Tracy's counsel, former United States Supreme
Court justice Arthur J. Goldberg; and MGM's counsel, former United States District
Court judge Lawrence E. Walsh. The case considered here arose out of the first
round of Tracy's takeover plan. A second, uncontested tender offer took place in
September 1969, Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1969, at 31, col. 4, which brought Tracy's
holdings to approximately 40% and resulted in the resignations of Chairman of the
Board Bronfman and President Polk. For a brief description of the entire contest,
see Business Week, Oct. 11, 1969, at 47. For further developments, see Penn,
Kerkorian Hints That Money Mentioned In Mob Wiretap Involved Sports Wager,
Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1970, at 28, cols. 1-4.
26 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344, 1346
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); note 13 supra.
27Brief for Plaintiff at 2, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.,
303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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Act.2" MGM argued that as the parent of Tracy's creditor, Trans-
america could wield substantial influence over MGM, thereby posing a
threat of lessening competition between MGM and United Artists.29
Moreover, if Tracy defaulted on its loan, Transamerica would acquire
a significant portion of MGM's stock, pledged as collateral for the loan.
The district court rejected the creditor-influence argument, but held
that the pledge of MGM stock to the principal shareholder of MGM's
competitor posed a threat of violation of the Clayton Act.3" The court
enjoined the offer and ordered Tracy to terminate or amend its loan
agreement with Financial.3 '
Within a few days Tracy filed amendments to its original tender
documents and announced that the offer would continue at the same
price. Tracy's new loan agreements provided for a $20,000,000 Euro-
dollar loan from Burkhardt & Company, a German banking institution,
and a $12,000,000 loan from Burston & Texas Commerce Bank
Limited, an English lender. Both loans were unconditionally guar-
anteed by Mr. Kerkorian and secured by pledges of securities having
a fair value of 150 per cent of the loan principal. One-half of the
collateral for the Burkhardt loan could include the unlisted securities
of a Tracy affiliate, International Leisure Corporation. Collateral for
the other half of the Burkhardt loan and the Burston & Texas loan
could include shares of MGM purchased pursuant to the tender offer.32
The day after publication of these agreements, Tracy announced that
it would seek an additional 740,000 shares of MGM common stock to
be financed by a second loan of $30,000,000 from Burkhardt &
Company-33
MGM's management again sought to enjoin Tracy from proceed-
ing with its offer, alleging that Tracy's Eurodollar financing violated
the margin requirements of regulations G and T, issued by the Board
under section 7 of the 1934 Act.3" MGM also charged that share-
holders tendering their stock in reliance upon the offer would be misled
by Tracy's failure to disclose a material fact-the illegality and un-
2
81d. 11-13. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), provides in
pertinent part:
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any. part
of the stock or other share capital . . . of one or more corporations engaged
in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks . . . or of the use of such stock
by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
29 Brief for Plaintiff at 12, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.,
303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
30 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344, 1352-53
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
31 Id. at 1354.
3 2 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354
1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (MGM's second motion for preliminary injunction); Wall St.
J., Aug. 7, 1969, at 20, cols. 4-6.
3 Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1969, at 20, cols. 4-6.
34 Brief for Plaintiff at 3, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.,
303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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reliability of the offeror's financing-in violation of sections 14(d) and
(e) of the 1934 Act.' In addition to injunctive relief, MGM sought
a discovery order to ascertain whether Tracy's dealer-manager, Kleiner-
Bell & Co., Inc., had violated regulation T by arranging the foreign
extension of credit on terms more favorable than it could lawfully
extend. 6
In support of its motion for preliminary injunction, MGM argued
that an extension of credit by a foreign lender for the purpose of pur-
chasing tendered shares must comply with the margin restrictions of
regulation G.37  Those lenders subject to this regulation may neither
extend nor arrange for an extension of "purpose credit" 3s in an amount
exceeding the "maximum loan value" of the "margin securities" 39
pledged as collateral for the loan. The maximum loan value of any
margin security is fixed at twenty per cent of its current market value.
40
Simply, if listed securities make up the collateral for a purchase loan,
their market value must be five times the principal of that loan.41 The
Tracy loans were secured by pledges of securities valued at only one
and one-half times their principal. Moreover, part of the collateral for
the Burkhardt loans could consist of pledges of unlisted securities, which
are disregarded when calculating whether sufficient collateral has been
pledged to satisfy regulation G's margin restrictions.' The legality of
Tracy's Eurodollar financing thus turned upon whether an extension
of credit by a foreign lender for the purpose of purchasing tendered
3515 U.S.C. §78m(d) & (e) (Supp. IV, 1969). These sections, which amended
the 1934 Act in 1968 and are commonly known as the Williams Act, authorize the
SEC to regulate the mechanics of cash tender offers. The Williams Act, inter alia,
requires disclosure of certain facts concerning a tender offer, permits tendering share-
holders to revoke their tenders within certain periods, requires the pro rata take-up
of all shares tendered in the first 10 days of the offer, and extends any increase in
price to those who tendered before the increase was announced. A general anti-fraud
provision, section 14(e), regulates the conduct of both the offeror and management
during the offer. Id. See Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HAgv. L. Rxv. 377, 381-89
(1969). In addition to the criminal penalties provided for fraudulent failure to pay
for tendered shares, a defaulting offeror may be found civilly liable for breach of
contract. Id. 384 n.44.
36 Text accompanying note 136 infra.
37 Brief for Plaintiff at 7-9, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.,
303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
as "Purpose credit" is "[clredit which is for the purpose, whether immediate,
incidental, or ultimate, of purchasing or carrying a margin security .... " 34 Fed.
Reg. 9193 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. § 2072(c) (1) (1969).
39 "Margin securities" include any equity security, defined in 15 U.S.C. § 
7 8c
(a) (11) (1964) as: a security registered on a national securities exchange, over-the-
counter (OTC) margin stock, certain convertible debt securities, and certain securities
issued by investment companies. See 34 Fed. Reg. 9193 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R.
§ 207.2(d)-(e) (1969).
4034 Fed. Reg. 9195 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. §207.5(a) (1969).
4 1 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354, 1357
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). If a customer pledges margin securities as part of his collateral
for a purpose loan, any other forms of pledged collateral are considered to have no
loan value. See 34 Fed. Reg. 9193, amending 12 C.F.R. §207.1(i) (1969).
42The unlisted securities were not "margin securities." See 34 Fed. Reg. 9193
(1969), amending 12 C.F.R. §2072(d) (1969). They therefore could not be used in
calculating "maximum loan value." See 34 Fed. Reg. 9195 (1969), amending 12
C.F.R. § 207.5(a) (1969).
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shares must comply with the regulation-that is, whether regulation G
has extraterritorial applicability.
Section 207.1 (a) of regulation G defines those lenders required to
register pursuant to the regulation:
Every person who, in the ordinary course of his business
extends or arranges for the extension of a total of
$50,000 or more or has outstanding at any time during the
calendar quarter, a total of $100,000 or more, in credit,
secured directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by collateral
that includes any margin securities . . is subject to the
registration requirements of this paragraph and shall, within
30 days following the end of the calendar quarter during
which such person becomes subject to such registration re-
quirements, register with the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System by filing a statement in conformity
with the requirements of Federal Reserve Form G-1 with the
Federal Reserve Bank of the district in which the principal
office of such person is located .... "
MGM contended that the term "every person" as used in section
207.1(a) is sufficiently broad to include foreign lenders within the
registration provisions as well as within the margin restrictions of
section 207.5.' MGM argued further that, although the definition
of lender does not explicitly include foreign lenders, a press release
accompanying the initial proposal did specifically refer to foreign credit
sources.45 Indeed, MGM continued, the entire scheme of the regulation
intended to close a loophole through which unregulated financing could
adversely affect the stability of the securities markets. MGM found
support for its position in the Second Circuit's opinion in Schoenbaurn
v. Firstbrook,4" in which Chief Judge Lumbard stated:
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order . . to protect the
domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities. In our view,
neither the usual presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion of legislation nor the specific language of Section 30(b)
show [sic] Congressional intent to preclude application of
the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in
the United States which are effected outside the United
43 34 Fed. Reg. 9191-92 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(a) (1969) (footnotes
omitted).
44 Brief for Plaintiff at 7-9, Mvfetro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.,
303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
451d. at 7-8. The press release stated, "Foreign lenders making loans that are
used to purchase or carry securities in this country would be subject to Regulation
G." 32 Fed. Reg. 14855 (1967); text accompanying note 88 infra.
46405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
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States, when extraterritorial application of the Act is neces-
sary to protect American investors.
MGM faced one particular difficulty in applying regulation G to
Tracy's foreign financing: regulation G applies to lenders, not bor-
rowers.48 However, MGM did not attempt to enjoin Tracy's tender
offer on the ground that Tracy must comply with the regulation's
margin requirements. Rather, MGM contended that: 1) regulation G
applied to the foreign lenders; 2) the foreign lenders were making an
unlawful loan; 3) Tracy must disclose the loan's illegality in the tender
offer.4"
Judge Tenney rejected MGM's assertion that foreign lenders were
subject to regulation G and held that "[n]othing in the 1934 Act-
nor in any of the Regulations promulgated thereunder, including Regu-
lation G-in any way indicates an attempt or intent to regulate the acts
of foreign lending institutions." 5' To reach this conclusion, the court
looked not only at section 207.1 (a)'s definition of those lenders re-
quired to register, but also at section 207.3(a), which states:
Every person who is registered pursuant to § 207.1 (a) shall
[periodically] file a report . . . with the Federal Reserve
Bank of the district in which the principal office of the lender
is located."-
Judge Tenney reasoned that the reach of the regulation was synon-
ymous with these registration and reporting requirements. 52  Because
the margin restrictions apply only to those lenders subject to the
registration requirements, and because the lenders subject to these
requirements must register within a federal reserve district, Judge
Tenney concluded that foreign lenders, having no principal place of
business within a federal reserve district, were not subject to the margin
restrictions. Moreover, even assuming the applicability of regulation G,
Judge Tenney found that section 30(b) '3 of the 1934 Act exempted
Tracy's foreign creditors from the Act and its regulations as persons
who "[transact] a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the
United States . . . . " 5 He based this conclusion upon his under-
standing that the Schoenbauin decision had construed section 30(b) to
47 Id. at 206.
48 Brief for Defendant at 13, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.,
303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
49 See Brief for Plaintiff at 9, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.,
303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
50 303 F. Supp. at 1357.
5112 C.F.R. §207.3(a) (1969).
2303 F. Supp. at 1357-58.
53 Section 30(b) is reproduced at text accompanying note 107 infra.
54 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1964); text accompanying notes 107-129 infra.
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categorically exclude foreign banks from the application of the 1934
Act. 5
MGM's motion for discovery was similarly denied. Although the
dealer-manager was subject to regulation T (prohibiting brokers from
arranging credit they could not lawfully extend),"' MGM had made no
showing which in the court's view 67 overcame the affidavit by Kleiner-
Bell denying that it had advised Tracy with regard to securing its
financing.6
This Comment will consider the applicability of regulations G and
T to the financing of domestic cash tender offers by foreign lending
institutions. Specifically, Part III will trace the development of regu-
lation G and analyze its extraterritorial reach in light of this develop-
ment and the foreign transactions exemption of section 30(b) of the
1934 Act. 2 Part IV will consider the participation of the dealer-
manager in arranging foreign financing under regulation T.
III. APPLICABILITY OF REGULATION G TO EXTENSIONS
OF PURPOSE CREDIT BY FOREIGN LENDERS
A. The Development of Regulation G
The pre-1929 use of securities transactions as a means for specu-
lation rather than for the transfer of ownership or formulation of
capital was abetted by the ability of purchasers to buy on credit with
as little as ten per cent margin. 0 Brokers willingly extended credit
to their customers and used the purchased securities as collateral.61 The
brokers' margin accounts were in turn financed by banks or other
lenders whose loans were similarly secured by a pledge of the purchased
securities. 2  The relative ease with which credit could be obtained
increased the number of purchasers, their ability to buy, and the market
55 303 F. Supp. at 1358.
56034 Fed. Reg. 9202 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. §220.7(a) (1969).
57 303 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
O8Affidavit of Burt Kleiner at 1, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica
Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); text accompanying notes 136-151 infra.
59 The impact of Judge Tenney's decision reaches beyond the financing of cash
tender offers. If foreign financing for the purchase of tendered shares does not require
the minimum collateral set by the Board, then any purchase of domestic securities
may be financed by Eurodollar loans. The conclusion of Parts III and IV of this
Comment apply with equal force to all foreign purchase loans, regardless of the
borrower's intent to buy control of a corporation or to make a speculative purchase.
G0 SENATE Comm. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, FACTORS AFFECTING THE STOCK
MARKET, S. REP. No. 1280, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 57 (1955).
01 The wide acceptance of securities as collateral has been attributed to their
ready marketability. This characteristic of "instant liquidity" enabled customers to
secure loans in amounts almost equaling the current market value of their purchases.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 9 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SEC
SPECIAL STUDY].
2This "double pledge" of the customer's securities could result in the customer
receiving a margin call if his broker failed to maintain the minimum margin required
by the bank. Cf. note 64 infra.
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value of traded securities. If the market value of the stock declined,
however, its value as collateral fell proportionately, thus reducing the
customer's margin and necessitating a margin call (demand for addi-
tional security) by the broker. If the customer could not provide addi-
tional collateral to restore the minimum percentage of margin required
by the loan agreement, the broker would sell the pledged stock." When
a market downturn occurred in late 1929, the prevalence of credit
buying led to a chain reaction effect 65 in the depreciation of market
values. Margin customers were unable to cover a decrease in the value
of their collateral, and forced sales intensified the pressure on an
already declining market. By increasing the volume of margin pur-
chases, excessive credit amplified this chain reaction and the severity
of the market break.66
Congressional response to both widespread investor losses and the
resulting damage to the national economy included the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Section 7 of the Act authorizes the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to prescribe margin standards
restricting the use of credit in securities transactions." Under section
7(c), the Board is directed to issue rules and regulations applicable to
the extension and maintenance of credit by brokers, dealers, and mem-
bers of national securities exchanges.6" In 1937 the Board adopted
regulation T, providing that credit may be extended in any amount 69
for the purchase of securities so long as a specified minimum of col-
lateral is maintained. ° Section 7(d) of the Act "' authorizes the Board
to set margin requirements for any lender not subject to section 7(c).
The Board exercised only a part of this authority when, in 1937, it
issued regulation U to govern extensions of credit by domestic banks.
Although narrower in scope than regulation T, regulation U prohibits
a domestic bank from making a stock-secured purchase loan not in
conformity with the margin requirements."2  However, a number of
63 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, FACTORs AFFECTING THE STOCK
MARKET, S. REP. No. 1280, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1955).
64 Brokers required their customers to maintain a certain indebtedness-to-collateral
ratio regardless of market price fluctuations. If a customer failed to respond to margin
calls, the broker or his creditor could "sell out" the collateral. SEC SPECIAL STUDY,
pt. 4, at 9.
6 See id., pt. 4, at 11.
66 See id., pt. 4, at 12.
6715 U.S.C. §78g(a) (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 15 U.S.C. §78g(a) (1964).
s 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
69 Section 7 and the regulations thereunder are concerned only with the collateral
on which credit is extended or arranged. They place no ceiling upon the amount which
may be borrowed.
74 34 Fed. Reg. 9196-9203, 9984 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. § 220.1-.8 (1969). Not
only does regulation T require collateral for purpose loans, but it specifies the only
permissible collateral as "registered securities." See 34 Fed. Reg. 9197, 9984 (1969),
amending 12 C.F.R. §220.3(c) (2) (1969).
7115 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
7A bank is subject to regulation U only when the borrower uses the loan to
purchase listed stock. Bank loans, unlike broker's credit under regulation T, can be
secured by collateral other than registered securities. 34 Fed. Reg. 9204, 9984
(1969), amending 12 C.F.R. §221.1 (1969).
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so-called "unregulated lenders," notably factors and foreign banks,
beyond the reach of either regulation T or U, made the same type
of purchase loans collateralized without regard to the margin
requirements. 3
The potential for excessive credit entering the market from these
unregulated lenders was first emphasized by the SEC's Special Study
of Securities Markets74 published in 1963. The Study's recom-
mendations, following its analysis of the activities and impact of these
lenders, formed the basis of what was to become regulation G.
The Study found that the absence of credit restrictions applicable
to these lenders created a potential for the same type of harm to the
economy caused by unregulated margin buying in 1929." Most of the
unregulated loans examined by the SEC had been extended for the
purpose of purchasing 76-and thus were collateralized with '--very
active listed securities. The high interest rates charged by these lenders
made their loans attractive only to those anticipating a quick rise in
market price.78 Thus, these loans went primarily to speculators, the
"in-and-out" traders most likely to cause the greatest market fluctua-
tions. 9 In addition, almost all domestic unregulated lenders used
borrowed capital,"° presumably requiring a second pledge of the
securities.
The SEC also found that foreign lenders were an important source
of capital for domestic factors and for direct lines of credit to individual
borrowers."' The Study noted that domestic banks acted as inter-
73 See SEC SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4, at 25-39.
74 H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4 (1963).
75 The SEC Special Study obtained its information about these lenders from
reports required by the Federal Reserve Board since 1960 under regulation U, 12
C.F.R. §221.3(j) (1969).
'76 SEC SPEciAL. S UDY, pt. 4, at 28. Although the dollar amount of unregulated
loans is small when compared to all security credit, the Special Study found that its
effect could be far greater than this ratio would indicate.
In a rising market the number of shares an individual can purchase is pyra-
mided if he can resort to unregulated credit, and his increased purchases
can push up the price. In a falling market, loans which have been only
10 to 30 percent margined are the first to be called; and their forced
sale accentuates the price decline. The experience in the spring of 1962 indi-
cates that it was the loans of unregulated lenders which were subject to
the earliest margin calls when the market started to decline. The effect of
these calls could only be to further depress the market.
Id. 33.
77 Id. 28.
78 Id. Because of the sporadic demand for unregulated loans and the volatile
character of the securities purchased and pledged as collateral, unregulated lenders
charged interest rates of 18% to 24% per year. Id.
79 It is precisely because of price volatility that lenders require minimum margin
maintenance. When the customer purchases very active securities, he risks a downturn
and forced sale if the decrease in the value of the stock causes the margin to fall
below the required maintenance level. Id. 9.
so Id. 28.
S'Id. 30. A single foreign lender studied by the SEC had extended to domestic
borrowers about a dozen lines of credit of approximately $500,000 each. Five of these
loans went to domestic unregulated lenders and the remainder to individual borrowers.
Id. 30 n.80.
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mediaries between their customers and foreign lenders. 2 Although
banks are prohibited by regulation U from arranging credit on terms
more favorable than they themselves could offer,84 section 221.3(q)
of the regulation permits banks to extend credit to certain unregulated
lenders.' Under this section, the participation of domestic banks in
aiding foreign lenders has ranged from actively arranging the loan to
mere custodial or clerical assistance.85
The SEC concluded that, to close the loophole in the section 7
regulatory scheme caused by the absence of controls over these credit
sources, the margin restrictions should be extended to all persons regu-
larly engaged in the business of lending on pledges of securities.88 The
Commission proposed that adequate information-gathering techniques
be devised to study the activities of unregulated lenders.8 Specifically,
the Study recommended:
Under the authority now provided by section 7 of the
Exchange Act, the Board of Governors should subject "all
persons" who make loans to U.S. residents, on the collateral
of securities traded in U.S. markets, to the same require-
ments as are applicable to domestic bank loans collateralized
by such securities, subject to appropriate exclusions for
lenders in specified categories such as those not engaged in a
business of lending or those never having aggregate outstand-
ing security loans of more than a specified amount, say,
$100,000. To aid in enforcement, domestic lenders should
be required to keep specified records and file periodic reports,
and domestic banks should be prohibited from furnishing any
form of assistance or service to any foreign lender in connec-
tion with any loan not in conformity with such requirement s5
The Board's initial proposals for regulation G closely paralleled
the SEC's recommendations.8 9 The first subsection, 207.1 (a), defined
a lender for the purpose of the regulation to include "every person" who
regularly extends purpose credit collateralized by listed securities." In
82Id. 30. The customer often pledged his securities through a domestic lender.
See id. 28.
8334 Fed. Reg. 9207 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. §221.3(u) (1969).
8434 Fed. Reg. 9206 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. §221.3(q) (1969). For a
discussion of so-called "q-lenders," see SEC SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4, at 29-30.
85 SEC SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4, at 30.
861d. 37. In addition to the damages caused by excessive credit extended by
unregulated lenders, the Study found that the absence of controls undermined the
effectiveness of existing regulations: brokers considered the restrictions discriminatory
because other lenders were free to extend credit or help their customers obtain
financing; bankers believed that the regulations could not be important if the loophole
for unregulated lenders were left open. Id. 33-34.
7Id. 39.
88 Id.
89 See Proposed Fed. Res. Reg. G § 207, 32 Fed. Reg. 14853 (1967).
90 Proposed Fed. Res. Reg. G § 207.1(a), 32 Fed. Reg. 14853 (1967).
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an explanatory note, the Board referred specifically to security credit
extended by foreign sources:
Foreign lenders making loans that are used to purchase
or carry securities in this country would be subject to Regu-
lation G. In most such cases, as well as in many instances
involving domestic lenders subject to the regulation, a re-
liable agency in this country, usually but not always a bank,
must be employed to hold the collateral for the loan, effect
substitutions, collect interest, and otherwise represent the
interest of the lender. Accordingly, a lender would be pro-
hibited from performing any services in respect to a loan that
was secured directly or indirectly by any registered security
unless the loan was made and maintained in conformity with
the requirements of the regulation.91
In light of comments received on its initial proposals, the Board
of Governors substantially revised regulation G. 2  Although still ap-
plicable to "every person" making purpose credit loans, lenders ex-
tending relatively small amounts of credit were exempted.9 3 Section
207.1 (a), defining those subject to regulation, and section 207.1 (b),
requiring their registration with the Board, were combined into the
present General Rule of section 207.1 (a)."' A release by the Board
described the "other lenders" (those beyond the reach of section 7(c)
or regulation U under section 7(d) ) which regulation G now brought
under the same restrictions applicable to banks and brokers. These
included:
"factors," "collateral lenders," and others whose stock loans
usually rise during periods when both margin requirements
and stock market activity are high; insurance companies;
tax-exempt organizations; credit unions; finance companies;
those State-chartered savings and loan associations authorized
to make such loans; and anyone acting as agent for a lender-
foreign or domestic-in handling securities loans.9 5
Sections 207.4(e) and (f), the agency transaction and "arranging
for credit" provisions of proposed regulation G, were also amended.
Prior to the amendment, they prohibited a lender from: (1) performing
"any services in respect to a loan" secured by registered securities
unless the loan conformed with the other requirements of the regu-
lation; and (2) arranging for credit on terms more favorable than he
9132 Fed. Reg. 14855 (1967).
92 Proposed Fed. Res. Reg. G § 207, 33 Fed. Reg. 2691 (1968).
' 3 Id.
94Id. 2696. For the text of the present version of section 207.1(a), see text
accompanying note 43 supra.
95 [1967-69 Transfer Binder] CCII 1967-69 FED. Sac. L. REp. 1 77,528, at 83,100
(1968).
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could give himself." The amendment substituted a standard of reason-
ableness for the strict liability arising from acting as an agent in a non-
conforming loan. 7  This revision, however, proved to be unworkable.
Yet, rather than restoring the per se prohibition, the Board eliminated
the agency provision altogether. Despite this change, the "arranging
for credit" provision remains as section 207.4(e). Like identical pro-
visions in regulations T and U, this section prohibits a lender from
arranging an extension or maintenance of credit on terms more favor-
able than he could lawfully extend.98
Three distinct parts of regulation G are apparent from this outline
of its regulatory scheme." First, section 207.1 (a), defining the lenders
subject to this regulation, implements the Board's authority under
section 7(d) of the 1934 Act to regulate all lenders other than brokers,
dealers, and members of national securities exchanges. The second
part of this scheme is the registration requirement, desigued to identify
those lenders subject to the regulation by requiring periodic reports of
their transactions. The arranging provision of section 207.4(e) is the
third element of the scheme relevant for this analysis. Patterned after
the recommendation of the SEC Special Study, it prevents circum-
vention of this regulation by prohibiting lenders or their agents from
arranging loans which they themselves could not lawfully extend.
B. Application of Regulation G to Tracy's Financing
As discussed above, Judge Tenney held that regulation G did not
apply to Tracy's financing 1 o because there are no Federal Reserve
9632 Fed. Reg. 14854-55 (1967).
97 Proposed Fed. Res. Reg. G § 207.4(f), 33 Fed. Reg. 2694 (1968).
98 See 12 C.F.R. § 207.4(f) (1969).
99 Shortly after the Board announced its proposed regulation G, six domestic
nonbank lenders sought to enjoin the enforcement of the new margin requirements.
They alleged that the Board had acted unconstitutionally when prescribing the regula-
tion, and that its enforcement would cause irreparable harm to their businesses. In an
exhaustive opinion, District Court Judge Herlands found that regulation G had not
been promulgated arbitrarily and that delay in its effectuation would cause confusion
on national securities exchanges and endanger the national economy as well as the
investing public. Collateral Lenders Comm. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve System, 281 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
100 Neither party raised the issue of applicability of the margin requirements to
cash tender offers financed by a domestic lender. Tracy might have contended that,
even assuming the applicability of the margin regulations to an individual's speculative
purchases, a cash tender offer, seeking control rather than quick profits, is a suffi-
ciently different market transaction to warrant exemption from these regulations.
Although § 7 and regulations G and T have never been applied in any case or
SEC administrative proceeding involving a domestic lender's financing of a take-
over bid, a 1959 Board interpretation of regulation U may be on point. The Board
was asked whether the regulation governs a stock-secured loan made for the business
purpose of purchasing a controlling interest in a corporation or whether the regulation
was directed exclusively toward purchases for speculative or investment purposes.
The Board responded that any stock-secured loan must conform to the regulation
regardless of the reason for which the purchase is made and noted that the inclusive
language "any loan . . . for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any stock"
implied that purchases for control were subject to regulation U. 12 C.F.R. §211.110
(1959). For a complete discussion of this topic, see Comment, Application of Margin
Requirements to the Cash Tender Offer, 116 U. PA. L. Rxv. 103 (1967).
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districts in Europe where the foreign creditors could register. 10' The
court assumed that the language prescribing where lenders must register
also impliedly states who must register. But this assumption was the
very issue for decision. By not adequately considering this issue,
Judge Tenney's decision unduly limits regulation G's extraterritorial
application.
The court's rationale fails in part because Judge Tenney amalga-
mated the three separate parts of the regulatory scheme: the general
definition of "every person," the registration requirements, and the
arranging provisions. The outline of regulation G's development
demonstrates the nexus between the recommendations of the SEC
Special Study and regulation G. The Study recommended that "'all
persons' who make loans to U.S. residents, on the collateral of securities
traded in U.S. markets, [be subject] to the same requirements as are
applicable to domestic bank loans collateralized by such securities
... ,, 10 Moreover, the exemption of lenders extending relatively
small amounts of credit is achieved by language modifying "every
person" at the beginning of section 207.1(a) : if other exemptions were
intended, presumably they also would have been included at this point.
These considerations illustrate the logical difficulty of construing a
phrase defining the appropriate place of registration as granting an
exemption to foreign lenders. Furthermore, if language defining the
place of registration were to narrow the reach of regulation G, the
regulation could be easily circumvented. A domestic lender could
simply establish his "principal office" in Montreal or the West Indies
and extend purpose credit immune from the margin requirements. 1 3
The minimal importance of the district reserve banks in the regis-
tration process also militates against judge Tenney's interpretation of
regulation G. A more sensible construction of section 207.1 (a) would
recognize that a lender must register with the Board of Governors-
not with a particular district bank. The requirement of registering
with the district bank is merely a ministerial convenience and not part
of the operative provisions of the regulation. Absent another limita-
tion on the applicability of regulation G,104 a foreign lender (or foreign
101 Text accompanying notes 50-53 stp ra.
102 SEC SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4, at 39; text accompanying note 88 supra.
103 Custody accounts maintained by foreign lenders with domestic banks have
enabled customers to secure unrestricted credit without even leaving the country. The
SEC Special Study, for example, found that a foreign-owned bank, located in New
York and registered under state banking laws, had on deposit funds of a bank located
in the West Indies. Although its own loans were subject to regulation U, the bank
arranged substantial lines of credit for unregulated lenders with the West Indian
bank on the security of portfolios of registered securities. While the funds extended
were those of the West Indian bank, the New York bank owned approximately 50%
of the outstanding shares of the West Indian bank. See SEC SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4,
at 30-31.
104 Such limitations might include Congress's ability to legislate extraterritorially
and the foreign transaction exemption of § 30(b) of the 1934 Act. For a discussion
of the jurisdictional basis for the foreign application of domestic securities law, see
Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUm.
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branch of a domestic lender) should be required to register wherever
his domestic agent has his principal place of business." 5
Requiring foreign lenders to comply with domestic margin limita-
tions presents the practical problem of policing the behavior of those
beyond the reach of a domestic court's in personam jurisdiction. This
problem may be surmountable in the tender offer context where the
plaintiff is not seeking to punish or pursue a claim against the foreign
lender but to enjoin an alleged illegality in the offeror's financing.
Recognizing that a tender offer, financed by Eurodollar loans not in
compliance with the margin restrictions, can be enjoined as a violation
of regulation G (or of section 14 of the Exchange Act, as a failure to
disclose the illegality in the offeror's statements to the SEC or in its
public tender offer), would enforce the policies of the margin
requirements.'0
C. The Foreign Transaction Exemption of Section 30(b)
Even if MGM had established the extraterritorial applicability of
regulation G, Judge Tenney probably would have found the Tracy
financing lawful, for in his view section 30(b) of the 1934 Act
specifically exempted the Eurodollar lenders from all other provisions.
Section 30(b) provides:
L. REv. 94 (1969). The author attributes the extraterritorial applicability of the 1934
Act to principles of (1) territorial jurisdiction, (2) nationality, and (3) national
interest. See id. 94-97. See also 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 784 n2 (2d ed.
1961). For a discussion of the inapplicability of the § 30(b) exemption to regulation
G's extraterritorial scope, see Part III C infra.
105 With one exception, all foreign lenders surveyed by the SEC Special Study
used a United States agent of some type. These agents conducted the routine nego-
tiations between borrowers and foreign lenders, insured the adequacy of the collateral
for each account, and acted as a repository for the securities. SEC SPEcrAL STuDY,
pt. 4, at 31. Even if a borrower negotiated his loan directly with the foreign lender,
the collateral usually remained with some agent of the lender in this country because, if
taken to Europe, collateral loses its characteristic of "instant liquidity."
1,06The margin restrictions promulgated under § 7 of the 1934 Act were intended
not only to restrict the volume of credit influencing the markets but to protect indi-
vidual investors who might be encouraged, by their brokers' readiness to extend credit,
to make purchases on thin margins. To further this policy, the courts have recog-
nized an implied right of action against a broker-dealer who extended or arranged
credit in violation of the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-89
(2d Cir. 1956); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Glickman v.
Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co.,
199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp.
1014 (D. Mass. 1949); Appel v. Levine, 85 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). The same
cause of action has been implied when incumbent management believed a tender offer
would harm their shareholders. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
Although the margin restrictions are directed against lenders' abuse of credit
transactions, a criminal prosecution may be brought against a borrower for violation
of section 7 of the 1934 Act. In United States v. 'Whorl, S.E.C. Litigation Release
4478 (Nov. 24, 1969), the defendant pleaded guilty to charges that he had lied to a
bank loan officer concerning the purpose of his loan, obtained funds to take up a stock
option, and pledged this stock as collateral for the non-conforming loan. The bank
was not prosecuted although its loan fell below the minimum margin requirements
set by the Board.
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The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regu-
lation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of
the United States, unless he transacts such business in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion
of this chapter.'
Section 30(b) was intended to relieve persons conducting a foreign
securities business from the necessity of complying with the reporting
and regulatory provisions of the 1934 Act' s It was also designed to
take the SEC out of the business of regulating foreign securities ex-
changes, thereby relieving it of the burden of enforcement where it could
not bring its investigatory powers to bear or subject the violators to
the sanctions of the Act.0 9
Although the phrase "transacts a business in securities" has been
broadly construed," the Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook
narrowed the exemption in such a way as to cast serious doubt upon its
applicability to a foreign purpose loan."' The plaintiff Schoenbaum, an
American, owned shares in Banff Oil Ltd., a Canadian corporation
listed on the American Stock Exchange. Aquitaine Co. of Canada,
Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of a French corporation, owned a
controlling interest in Banff. Banff and Aquitaine began joint ex-
plorations for oil in March 1964. In December 1964, the Board of
Directors of Banff voted to sell 500,000 shares of Banff treasury stock
to Aquitaine. Following this vote but prior to sale, the joint ex-
ploration discovered oil. The sale was made at the December 1964
market price."' Schoenbaum brought a shareholder's derivative suit
alleging violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and of SEC rule
10b-5.13 The district court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants on the ground, inter alia, that the court lacked jurisdiction
because the 1934 Act did not have extraterritorial application.
114
The court of appeals reversed on the issue of jurisdiction. Speak-
ing for the court, Chief Judge Lumbard interpreted section 30(b) to
exempt only those "persons conducting a business in securities through
foreign securities markets" and not to "preclude extraterritorial ap-
plication of the Exchange Act to persons who engage in isolated
10715 U.S.C. §78dd(b) (1964).
108 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F2d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 1968).
309 Id. at 207-08.
110 In Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the court exempted a
sale-of Canadian securities by a Canadian broker to an American buyer-from the
margin requirements of § 7(c) of the 1934 Act because the sale occurred in Canada
and was part of the broker's business. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
208 (2d Cir. 1968).
i' See 405 F2d at 208.
112 Id. at 204-05.
113 Id. at 204.
114 Id.
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foreign transactions." "' The court reasoned that since Congress had
included an exemptive provision for certain foreign transactions and
had given the SEC rule-making authority to limit the exemption, the
presumption arose that Congress intended the Act to extend to all
foreign transactions not specifically exempted." 6 The court concluded:
We hold that the district court has subject matter juris-
diction over violations of the Securities Exchange Act al-
though the transactions which are alleged to violate the Act
take place outside the United States, at least when the trans-
actions involve stock registered and listed on a national secu-
rities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of
American investors." 7
When the section 30(b) exemption has been narrowed, as the
Schoenbaum decision suggests, to specifically exempted persons regu-
larly engaged in the purchase and sale of securities through foreign
securities markets, extraterritorial application of regulation G poses
little problem. The Commission would not be called upon to investigate
or regulate foreign securities exchanges. The Commission itself might
enforce regulation G if the target's management were friendly to the
takeover and thus lacked the incentive to challenge the legality of the
offeror's financing."8  However, when management is hostile and the
violation recognized, private enforcement by suits to enjoin the tender
offer may induce compliance.
Judge Tenney, however, erroneously interpreted the Schoenbaum
decision to include foreign banking institutions within the section 30 (b)
exemption." 9  Chief Judge Lumbard, in construing section 30(b),
compared it to section 30(a).121 Section 30(a) provides:
It shall be unlawfulfor any broker or dealer . . . to
make use of the mails or of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce for the purpose of effecting on an ex-
change not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, any transaction in any security the issuer of which is
a resident of, or is organized under the laws of, or has its
principal place of business in, a place within or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, in contravention of such
15 Id. at 207. See also Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
116 405 F.2d at 208.
"17 Id.
-18 The SEC could seek to enjoin the offer under §§ 14(d) and (e) of the Act
by alleging that failure to disclose this illegality in the tender documents amounted
to a material misstatement of fact.
19 Judge Temey concluded, "This provision [§ 30(b)] has been expressly con-
strued to exclude foreign banks. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F2d 200, 208 ... "
303 F. Supp. at 1358.
120 The language of § 30(b) is set out at text accompanying note 107 supra.
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rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
121
The Chief Judge noted that section 30(a) refers to "any transaction in
any security outside the jurisdiction of the United States," whereas
section 30(b) exempts "any person insofar as he transacts a business
in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States .... " 2
He reasoned that the draftsmen of section 30(b) used the term "any
person" rather than "broker or dealer" because sections 3(a) (4) and
(5) of the 1934 Act1 defined the terms "broker" and "dealer" to
exclude banks. The term "bank" is defined in section 3 (a) (6) of the
Act to include only banking institutions organized under or "doing
business under the laws of any State or of the United States .... ," 124
Thus, in order to exempt banks that transacted businesses in securities
from the application of the 1934 Act, section 30(b) refers to "any
person." Chief Judge Lumbard concluded that "brokers and dealers
and banks otherwise subject to the Act [were exempted] insofar as
they conduct transactions not subject to section 30(a) outside the
United States, even though their United States transactions are subject
to the Act." 12
Foreign banks do not fit Chief Judge Lumbard's description of
exempt institutions as "banks otherwise subject to the Act" because
they are not organized or operated under state or federal law. Thus,
Judge Tenney's complete reliance on Schoenbaum as authority for
exempting foreign banks was misplaced.2
At the close of his opinion, Judge Tenney observed that even if
the Tracy loan agreements were violative of the margin restrictions,
MGM had made no showing that the contracts would be unenforceable
or that the foreign lenders could assert this illegality as a defense in an
action for specific performance and thereby render the financing un-
reliable for those who tendered their shares.l"T This reasoning is
12115 U.S.C. §78dd(a) (1964).
129 405 F2d at 208.
=-215 U.S.C. §78c( 4 ) & (5) (1964).
124 Id. § 78c(6).
= 405 F2d at 208.
-126 Contrary to Judge Tenney's conclusion, an argument based upon the definition
of banks in § 3(a) (6) of the 1934 Act would work precisely against excluding
foreign lenders from the margin restrictions. Section 7(c) makes unlawful the ex-
tension of credit by a broker, dealer, or member of a national stock exchange except
upon such terms as the Board prescribes. Section 3(a) (4) defines "dealer" to
include "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for
the account of others, but does not include a bank." As used in this section, bank
refers to domestic banks organized or operated under state or federal law. If the
definition of "dealer" as one who "effects transactions in securities" is broader than the
§30(b) phrase, "transacts a business in securities," as narrowed by Schoenbaurn
to mean purchases or sales on a foreign securities market, and thus includes financing
arrangements, a foreign lending institution should be considered a "dealer" subject
to the margin requirements of regulation T.
=2 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354, 1359
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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particularly disturbing because it ignores the primary purpose of the
margin requirements. It classifies the Tracy loan agreements as en-
tirely private transactions between borrower and lender and disregards
the overriding public interest in protecting domestic investors and
securities markets from the dangers of excessive speculation 18 en-
couraged by unregulated sources of purchase credit.2 9
IV. PARTICIPATION OF THE DEALER-MANAGER: THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST ARRANGING CREDIT
Were brokers permitted to arrange credit they themselves could
not extend, the margin restrictions could easily be circumvented.'
Therefore, section 7(c) of the 1934 Act 131 speaks in alternatives; its
restrictions apply with equal force to the extension or arrangement of
credit by a dealer or broker. The section states:
It shall be unlawful for any member of a national secu-
rities exchange or any broker or dealer, directly or indirectly,
to extend or maintain credit or arrange for the extension or
maintenance of credit to or for any customer-
(1) on any security . . . in contravention of the
rules and regulations which the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System shall prescribe .
(2) without collateral or on any collateral other
than securities, except in accordance with such rules
and regulations .... "
Thus, section 7(c) makes it unlawful for any dealer-manager who is a
member of a national securities exchange, broker, or dealer (broker-
dealers) to arrange an extension of credit for the offeror, except insofar
as regulations permit.
Under the authority of this section, the Board promulgated regu-
lation T. Section 220.7(a) of this regulation controls the arranging
of credit by such dealer-managers:
A creditor may arrange for the extension or maintenance
of credit to or for any customer of such creditor by any
person upon the same terms and conditions as those upon
which the creditor, under the provisions of this part, may him-
self extend or maintain such credit to such customers .... 133
128 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
M For a discussion of the dangers inherent in excessive purchase credit, see text
accompanying notes 60-66 supra.
13o See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), reported in 78 CONG.
REc. 7701, 7703-04 (1934).
13115 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
= Id.
133 34 Fed. Reg. 9202 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. § 220.7(a) (1969).
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This section makes explicit that the legality of the dealer-manager's
participation depends not upon the legality of the terms of the loan, but
rather upon whether the dealer-manager arranged the loan on terms
more favorable than he himself could extend. Since regulation T pre-
scribes the margin requirements for every broker-dealer's loan, the
only issue is what acts by the dealer-manager constitute "arranging."
Along the spectrum of dealer-manager participation, four points
are distinct: (1) If the dealer-manager contacts a lending institution
on behalf of the offeror and negotiates a plan of financing on terms
more favorable than he himself could extend, his participation clearly
constitutes an unlawful arranging. (2) If the dealer-manager indi-
rectly participates by contacting one lender who in turn establishes a
line of credit for the offeror with another lender, the dealer-manager's
participation is similarly unlawful if the terms of the loan violate those
margin restrictions applicable to him. (3) If the dealer-manager aids
the financing only incidentally, "as by conveying the customer's com-
munications or instructions to the [lender] or by responding to re-
quests or directives of the [lender] concerning the customer's trans-
actions," 134 his minimal participation may nevertheless fall within the
prohibition of regulation T.35 (4) If the dealer-manager is not in-
volved in the financing in any way, his acts cannot be proscribed as
"arranging."
In addition to its motion for preliminary injunction, MGM sought
discovery to ascertain whether the participation of Tracy's dealer-
manager, Kleiner-Bell, constituted unlawful arranging. MGM rea-
soned that, even if Tracy's Eurodollar financing was not governed by
regulation G, and the loans were thus legal, MGM could still enjoin the
tender offer under regulation T if unlawful arranging could later be
established.
Tracy's sole shareholder, Mr. Kirk Kerkorian, negotiated the
Eurodollar financing for the tender offer. Thus, MGM could not al-
lege that the dealer-manager had negotiated the Eurodollar financing
as in example (1) above. But MGM hoped discovery would prove
indirect or incidental participation, as in examples (2) or (3) above.
Tracy countered by offering the affidavit of Mr. Bert Kleiner, president
of the dealer-manager, in which he stated that his firm had not arranged
the financing, had neither counseled nor advised Tracy in regard to the
financing, and would not receive the tendered shares because all of the
offered stock was to go directly to the depository banks which would
make payment on behalf of Tracy.'36 Judge Tenney held, on the basis
of the legal conclusion stated in this affidavit and on MGM's present
inability to produce evidence of unlawful participation, that the dealer-
13 4 Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443, 457 (1963).
13 5 See Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443 (1963).
136 Affidavit of Burt Kleiner at 1-2, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Trans-
america Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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manager had not "arranged" the Eurodollar loans. MGM's motion
for discovery was denied.
By ignoring the possible unlawful indirect or incidental aspects of
arranging, this holding contradicts in part the strict prohibitions against
brokers acting as financial intermediaries for their customers either by
negotiating extensions of credit or by acting as agents for the lending
institutions. Section 7(c) reflects both congressional mistrust of
brokers' credit transactions and an intent to remove control of margin
buying from those whose self-interest had resulted in the past in ex-
cessive speculation through credit buying.' The fear that brokers
might circumvent the margin restrictions is also evident in section
220.7(a) of regulation T, prescribing the only circumstances under
which a broker-dealer may provide arranging services for his cus-
tomers. 3 The intent of Congress to take all control of margin buying
from broker-dealers and vest it in the discretion of the Board requires
a broad construction of the arranging provision of regulation T. Sec-
tion 7(c) contemplates any scheme involving a broker's participation
in a purchase of securities aided by a stock-secured loan; the Board's
implementing regulation should be so construed.
Arguably, if actual negotiation or agency participation cannot be
shown, evidence that the dealer-manager coordinated the offering and
solicited tenders to be purchased with the proceeds of the financing
could constitute an unlawful arranging. A similar contention was
advanced by the SEC's Division of Trading and Exchanges in an
SEC proceeding, Sutro Bros. & Co. 39 Salesmen for a registered
broker-dealer arranged credit for themselves and their customers in
excess of the amount the broker-dealer could have extended. By
utilizing special cash accounts and the services of factors, 4 ° both ar-
ranged by Sutro Bros.'s salesmen, customers could purchase securities
on margin as low as twenty per cent. In some instances, the salesmen's
activities included furnishing information about factors, preparing and
delivering instructions to the margin department, filling out clearance
forms, promissory notes, verification letters, and calling the factor
concerning details of the transactions.' Sutro Bros. conceded that
salesmen participating to this extent violated regulation T, but con-
137H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), reported in 78 CONG. REc.
7701, 7703-04 (1934).
138See 34 Fed. Reg. 9202 (1969), amending 12 C.F.R. §220.7(a) (1969). The
text of § 220.7(a) is reproduced at text accompanying note 133 supra.
339 41 S.E.C. 443 (1963).
140 Factors typically extend credit through 2 types of transactions. First, a
conventional collateral loan might be arranged. The factor advances an agreed
percentage of the purchase price and the customer instructs his broker to buy the
securities and deliver them to the factor as collateral. Second, the borrower may
purchase and immediately resell the securities without putting up any margin. The
factor advances no funds until the "clearance transaction" has been completed, assuring
his prompt payment. If the selling price exceeds the cost, the factor advances to the
borrower the entire purchase price. If it is lower, the factor receives the difference
or keeps the securities. See id. at 447-48 nn.11 & 12.
'41 Id. at 456.
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tended that "where a salesman did no more than execute orders and
prepare delivery instructions at the direction of [his] customer," 142 no
violation could be found.
The Division of Trading and Exchanges of the SEC argued "that
a broker directly or indirectly 'arranges' if 'knowing or with reasonable
grounds to know that the customer has himself secured credit in excess
of that permitted by Regulation T, [the broker] [sic] performs any
act or deed for the purpose of assisting the customer in . . . imple-
menting it .... 1 ,, 143 The Commission rejected this position, rea-
soning that a broker should not be forced to insure that his customers
were employing only such credit as he could extend. The Commis-
sion's position was limited, however, to those cases in which the cus-
tomer initiated the credit transactions without recommendation or
assistance from the broker, whose only function or connection with
the transaction was to execute the customer's instructions regarding
delivery and receipt of payment. 4
But the Commission also rejected Sutro Bros.'s argument that if
the broker-dealer did "not negotiate . . . the terms of the loan, furnish
credit information concerning the borrower or exercise some influence
on the lender to make the loan," " no "arranging" within the meaning
of section 7(c) had occurred. In the Commission's view, the standard
for determining the legality of a broker-dealer's participation in credit
transactions fell between negotiating the financing and acting merely
as a broker uninvolved in the customer's financial arrangements. The
SEC concluded that:
We think it unnecessary to attempt to define the various
circumstances under which many other specific acts short of
procuring or negotiating might involve the broker in an un-
lawful arranging. But we think it clear that when a broker
permits himself to become the intermediary between customer
and factor with respect to the customer's account or dealings
with the factor, as by conveying the customer's communica-
tions or instructions to the factor or by responding to requests
or directives of the factor concerning the customer's trans-
actions, the broker becomes so involved in the extension or
maintenance of credit for the customer as to be held to be
arranging. These are activities in relation to the credit absent
which the credit would not be supplied by the factor. If the
broker acts for the customer or factor in these matters, he has
involved himself in the financial arrangements which are en-
tirely unrelated to his functions of executing the customer's
orders and following the customer's instructions as to the
delivery of securities and payment .... In this connection,
1422 Id.
143 Id. at 451.
144Id. at 451-52.
145Id. at 456.
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we also consider it immaterial that in some instances a cus-
tomer may have taken the initiative in suggesting the use of
a factor or that a salesman at one point may have sought,
albeit unsuccessfully, to discourage the use of a factor. 46
This language demonstrates that dealer-manager activity falling
short of actual negotiation of the loan may nevertheless be viewed as
arranging credit if without the activity the credit would not have been
extended. Therefore, Judge Tenney should not have denied MGM's
motion for discovery on the basis of the dealer-manager's self-serving
affidavit denying that he had arranged the Eurodollar financing. This
is not to suggest that an offer be enjoined during the discovery process
absent some other illegality. Rather, discovery would merely permit
a party to determine if the dealer-manager's participation in the financ-
ing could be deemed "arranging credit" under section 7(c) and regu-
lation T. Thus, the discovering party would be given the opportunity
to determine if the dealer-manager had attempted to arrange credit with
other lenders, furnished information concerning the customer to his
creditors, provided either to lender or borrower services influential in
securing the loan, or engaged in any other activities without which the
offeror would not have received the funds.
In the context of the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer case, the dealer-
manager's affidavit was sufficient on its face to have eliminated much
of MGM's potential for establishing that Tracy would not have received
its Eurodollar loans without the aid of Kleiner-Bell. The Sutro Bros.
tests were derived, however, in a different context: the factual setting
of Sutro Bros. may explain the Commission's decision to reject the
formulation of the Division of Trading and Exchanges in favor of its
own, more restrictive, "but for" test. Even if the collateral fell below
the margin restrictions, loans by factors or other unregulated lenders
were lawful in 1963. Moreover, the broker-dealer in Sutro Bros., in
a disciplinary proceeding before the SEC, was charged with several
violations of section 7 and faced the serious sanctions of the 1934
Act.' In the instant case, the loans themselves were alleged to be
unlawful, and the arranging provisions of regulation T were raised only
as a basis for a discovery order or possible injunction at a later time.'
48
146Id. at 456-57 (emphasis added). See Russell L. Irish, 1964-66 CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 77, 297 (1965).
147If a broker-dealer is found in violation of §7(c), the SEC can revoke
his registration or suspend or expel him from a national securities exchange. Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 §15(b) (5), 15 U.S.C. §78o(b) (5) (1964).
148 On the other hand, enjoining the tender offer could mean at least the loss of
the offeror's "sunk costs." Even a temporary delay permits incumbent management
to try further defensive tactics, and might drive off arbitrageurs who purchase large
blocks of stock on the market and tender near the closing date. Consequently, it could
be argued that the Sutro Bros. tests should not be liberalized in the context of a cash
tender offer. Nevertheless, because the statutory sanctions which Sutro Bros. faced
could have been just as damaging to their business as enjoining the tender offer might
be to an acquiring corporation, this argument certainly cannot justify a narrowing
of the "but for" tests.
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If discovery revealed that but for the dealer-manager's reputation, his
plan for promoting the offer, and his assurances of its financial success,
the lenders would not have become involved, incumbent management
might be able to show participation sufficient to justify an injunction.'4
While regulation T certainly cannot be construed to forbid dealer-
manager participation wholly unrelated to the financing aspects of the
offer, the Sutro Bros. tests could reasonably be extended in this manner
to provide another basis for the private enforcement of margin re-
strictions.' This construction would not impose upon a broker the
burden of insuring his customer's credit arrangements, for the arrang-
ing provisions are always subject to a showing of "good faith" by the
alleged violator. 5 '
V. CoNcLUsIoN
As a result of the great increase in the number of takeover attempts
in recent years, much of our securities law has been decided on motions
for preliminary relief. Participants on both sides have taken their
battles for control off the financial pages and into the courts.
Judge Tenney's decision affects at least two areas beyond tender
offer financings. Substantively, if Eurodollar loans to purchase ten-
dered shares do not require the minimum collateral set by the Board,
any purchase of domestic securities can be so financed. The con-
clusions of this Comment-that regulation G has extraterritorial
effect and that a dealer-manager's participation must be closely
scrutinized for "arranging"-should apply with equal force to all
foreign purchase loans. Procedurally, Judge Tenney's decision brings
into focus the question whether a court can be properly apprised of
the facts and law applicable to a particular controversy when motions
for injunctive relief are brought on by an order to show cause
returnable in twenty-four or forty-eight hours. If management hopes
to block a takeover and chooses legal action as its most effective
tactic, it must find an illegality if possible," 2 manufacture one if
149 It would appear at first glance that, without these 3 factors, no lender would
become involved and that, therefore, this definition of arranging is too broad. Of
course, any one of these factors may be insufficient to constitute "arranging." Indeed,
all 3 may not justify an injunction if the dealer-manager is a prominent brokerage
house with a long history of successful tender offers and the assurances constitute no
more than puffing. But these and other factors must be examined on a case by case
basis. Because these 3 factors might not establish "arranging" in one case certainly
does not preclude the opposite finding in another. The point is only that the court
should look beyond actual negotiation to determine whether the dealer-manager
arranged the offeror's credit.
150 Note 106 supra & accompanying text.
'
51 See 12 C.F.R. §220.111 (1969).
152See, e.g., Electronics Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d
937 (2d Cir. 1969) (alleged violation of the Williams Act) ; Muskegon Piston Ring
Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 328 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1964) (alleged violation of
Clayton Act) ; Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., CCH 1969 FED. SEC.
L. REP. 92,467 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1969) (alleged violation of SEC rule 10b-6);
United Gas Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 248 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam,
354 F2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1965) (alleged violation of Public Utility Holding Company
Act).
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necessary,"53 and file motions with supporting briefs and affidavits-all
within a matter of days.'5 4 Though the offeror may anticipate legal
action by hostile management, his counsel can never be certain where
the challenge will come and often must prepare a rebuttal within
twenty-four hours. 5 The urgency generated by management's efforts
to stop the offer similarly infects the court, obliged to resolve the issues
within one or two days after argument. Not surprisingly, arguments
prepared in such haste and decisions rendered under the pressures of an
ongoing offer can result in bad law.
Even though it be admitted that such decisions could adversely
effect the securities laws, these suits may nevertheless have very
beneficial consequences for the public. If the management of MGM
had decided not to fight the Tracy tender offer, probably no one would
ever have complained of the Eurodollar financing. Those who tendered
did so at a premium; those who retained their stock were counting on
new management for future profits. But the satisfaction of the par-
13 Speed is essential to a successful takeover bid. Regardless of the merits of
a particular allegation, legal action may break the offeror's momentum and allow
the incumbents time to mobilize a publicity campaign, defensive merger, or counter
offer. The cloud of litigation may also chill the shareholders' willingness to tender
and cast doubt upon the offeror's motive. Judge Friendly in Electronic Specialty Co.
v. International Controls Corp., 409 F2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), argued that "the appli-
cation for a preliminary injunction is the time when relief can best be given," but
warned the district courts not to grant interlocutory relief lightly but to be "vigilant
against resort to the courts on trumped-up or trivial grounds as a means for delaying
and thereby defeating legitimate tender offers." Id. at 947. He concluded that:
Probably there will no more be a perfect tender offer than a perfect trial.
Congress intended to assure basic honesty and fair dealing, not to impose an
unrealistic requirement of laboratory conditions that might make the new
statute [the Williams Act] a potent tool for incumbent management to
protect its own interests against the desires and welfare of the stockholders.
These considerations bear on the kind of judgment to be applied in testing
conduct-of both sides-and also on the issue of materiality. As to this we
reaffirm the test announced in Symington Wayne . . . 383 F.2d at 843,
whether "any of the stockholders who tendered their shares would probably
not have tendered their shares" if the alleged violations had not occurred.
Id. at 948.
154 The sequence of events culminating in Judge Tenney's opinion ran as follows:
(1) July 23-Tracy published first tender offer; (2) July 28-MGM filed complaint
and moved for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction;
district court issued TRO; (3) July 29-court issued order to show cause; (4) July
30--court extended TRO; Tracy filed answer to complaint and a memorandum in
opposition to the injunction; Tracy obtained Eurodollar financing; (5) August 2-
court preliminarily enjoined Tracy's financing by Transamerica Financial; (6) August
5-Tracy publicly announced Eurodollar financing and continuation of tender offer;
(7) August 6-Tracy offered to take additional 740,000 shares; (8) August 7-MGM
filed motion for preliminary injunction of the Eurodollar financing and a supplemental
complaint; court issued order to show cause; (9) August 8-Tracy filed memo-
randum opposing to injunction; court held hearing on preliminary injunction; Judge
Tenney delivered his opinion. See Record, at B, C, 2-1 to 2-2, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
155 In the Southern District of New York, a legal challenge to a tender offer
usually has 3 phases. Management first seeks a temporary restraining order. Affi-
davits are then submitted by the parties, and the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction brought on by an order to show cause. At the hearing, additional evidence
may be offered or those subscribing to the affidavits may be cross-examined. The
court then determines if preliminary relief is warranted and either continues the
temporary order or denies the motion.
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ticipants in an uncontested takeover must never outweigh the over-
riding public interest in protecting investors and the securities markets.
Transactions between debtors and creditors have been seen as affected
with a public interest since the earliest usury statutes. Similarly, the
margin restrictions protect the borrower from his own imprudence, the
investing public from market fluctuations, and the national economy
from the chain reaction depreciation of stock values characteristic of
the 1929 collapse.'8 6
To construe regulation G not to encompass foreign lenders is un-
tenable. The Board was fully aware of the potential for excessive
credit generated by unregulated lenders and promulgated regulation G
in response to the recommendations of the SEC Special Study. To
say on the one hand that the Board sought to close a loophole through
which unrestricted credit could reach the markets, and on the other
that the registration requirements evidence an intent not to fully imple-
ment the Board's authority under section 7, is a contradiction un-
permitted by a reasonable interpretation of the terms of the regulation.
When it can be shown that Congress had the legislative jurisdiction to
regulate the conduct of foreign lenders ' 7 whose transactions could so
adversely effect domestic markets, and did not specifically exclude the
Board's exercise of its authority by section 30(b), the limitations im-
posed by Judge Tenney upon the extraterritorial application of regu-
lation G cannot be justified.
The need for application of margin restrictions to foreign lenders
is even greater for tender offers than for ordinary purchase loans. The
number of shares which the offeror can purchase increases in direct
proportion to the increasing availability of purpose credit. Similarly,
he can increase the premium, hoping to insure success. Almost by
definition, the premium will create a market fluctuation upward to the
offered price. While it might be argued that the sheer number of
shares held as collateral by the lender would deter him from selling out
if the offeror defaulted, why, when Congress has declared its mistrust
of domestic broker-dealers' handling of credit transactions, should our
securities law depend upon the self-interest of foreign lenders to pre-
vent damaging sellouts? 1"8
15 6 See 2 L. Loss, SEcumRms REGuLATioN 1242-43 (2d ed. 1961); SEC SPEC&L
STUDY, pt. 4, at 2-3.
157Note 104 supra.
18 In addition to the fear of rapid sellouts by foreign lenders if the market were
to take a sudden downturn, the SEC is concerned that control of major corporations
could shift to interests whose identities are more easily masked by foreign secrecy
laws. Foreign financing often enables the offeror to use these secrecy laws, thereby
making it more difficult for the SEC to detect possible violations of the disclosure
requirements of the Williams Act. Note 35 supra. In April 1969, a group of
dissident shareholders of Bath Industries sought to oust the incumbent management
by purchasing additional shares and pooling their votes. The outsiders included a
foreign investment company and foreign bank. In violation of the disclosure rules, the
identity of the group attempting to gain control was not disclosed to the shareholders.
See Statement of Irving M. Pollack, Director of SEC's Division of Trading &
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The same mistrust of broker-dealer credit transactions and a fear
that they might circumvent the margin restrictions underlies the
"arranging" provision of regulation T. The strict prohibitions of sec-
tion 220.7(a) of regulation T should be given effect by finding un-
lawful any scheme in which a broker's participation results in his
customer's receipt of credit. Finding such an illegality does not depend
upon the broker-dealer himself extending credit, but rather that, but
for his activities as financial intermediary, loans in excess of the
amount which he could extend would not have reached his customer.
When management charges that the dealer-manager unlawfully
"arranged" the offeror's financing on terms more favorable than he
could extend, the district court's inquiry should be directed only to the
dealer-manager's conduct with regard to the financing. Because the
statute and regulation T focus upon the participation of the broker-
dealer, activities beyond this point are irrelevant unless they bear upon
the lender's willingness to advance the credit.
William James Nutt
Markets, Before the House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
printed in JAN.-JuN. BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. X-6 (Mar. 4, 1970).
The Commission also fears that even if disclosure of foreign financing is made,
the real parties behind the loan may not be revealed. Eurodollar credit arrangements
often involve a lead bank and numerous undisclosed lenders sharing the risk of the
loan. If the offeror defaults, these undisclosed interests may acquire control of the
target. Id. See Penn, Kerkorian Hints That Money Mentioned In Mob Wiretap
Involved Sports Wager, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1970, at 28, cols. 1-4. The much-
publicized takeover of UMC Industries, a St. Louis defense contractor, by Liquidonics
Industries, Inc. justifies the Commission's concern. The controlling interest in UMC
was purchased with a loan of $40 million from Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas
(Suisse). Liquidonics received only $36.9 million net proceeds of the loan because
of the high financing charges. When unable to meet the repayment schedule set by
the loan agreements, Liquidonics went into arrears and was forced to sell out at a loss
of nearly $16 million. The majority stock interest of UMC is presently owned by a
Luxembourg banking institution, a subsidiary of the Swiss bank. UMC's new owners
haven't disclosed their intentions for the company. For a brief description of the
Liquidonics-UMC controversy, see Business Week, Oct. 4, 1969, at 32. See also
Matthews, UMC Take-Over Threat Removed, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 4, 1970,
at 8B, cols. 1-4.
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